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Abstract
This  article  reviews  research  related  to  conscious  and  unconscious  processes  in  L2  and  LI
vocabulary  acquisition.  Firstly  it  presents  a  summary  conceptual  analysis  of  the  different
aspects  of  vocabulary  acquisition.  After  demonstrating  that  most  vocabulary  acquisition
typically comes as a result of incidental learning, it next considers three research areas: (i) the
associations  between  vocabulary  and academic  intelligence,  (ii)  implicit  memory,  (iii)  global
amnesia. These diverse areas all reveal a dissociation whereby the recognition and production
aspects of vocabulary learning rely on implicit learning, but meaning and mediational aspects
of  vocabulary  heavily  involve  explicit,  conscious learning  processes.  The  operations  of  the
input and output (I/O) lexical modules are briefly described,  followed by an analysis  of the
explicit cognitive systems for mediation with semantics and conceptual systems. Finally the
pedagogic implications of these findings are outlined.
Introduction
There are now many demonstrations of the dissociation between unconscious
and conscious processes of learning. This division roughly parallels that between
practical or tacit intelligence and academic or explicit intelligence. The research
priority that necessarily follows from such distinctions is to determine which of
human cognitive capabilities are acquired implicitly and which learned explicitly.
This  question is  both  of  theoretical  and  practical  pedagogic  importance  since
teaching interventions are of less  relevance to implicitly learned skills  but are
essential to explicitly learned ones.
Nowhere has the role of consciousness been more a matter of debate than in
the realm of human language skills, both in native (LI) and second (L2) languages
(Ellis, in press a). Radical swings in the history of L2 teaching methodologies reflect
this schism (see Kelly, 1969and R. Ellis, 1990 for reviews). Traditional 'Grammar-
translation'  methods emphasised study by literacy and translation and had  an
explicit bias  with  formal  explanation of  L2 rules and a  deductive approach to
learning. Come the Second World War the Behaviourist Zeitgeist in America led to
Structural Approaches and Audiolingual methods which outlawed the teaching of
metalinguistic rules and which regarded L2 as just another specific domain to be
understood by general laws of learning - L2 acquisition involved discrimination and
generalisation  from structured  examples  by  analogy  not  analysis,  i.e.  implicit,
inductive  learning  through  patterned  practice.  By  the  1960s  critics  began  to
observe  that  these  methods  produce  fluent  but  flawed  speakers  (e.g.
"Audiolingual methods have been teaching speech but not language”, Donaldson,
1971, p. 123) and explicit instruction of grammatical rules was reintroduced in the
Cognitive Code Method, 'a modified, up-to-date translation theory' (Carroll, 1966, p.
102), which held that perception and awareness of L2 rules precede their use. In
the 1970s and 80s the pendulum swung back to Naturalistic methods (Krashen,
1982, 1985).  Krashen’s underlying theory, the Input Hypothesis, is a non-interface
position in that it  posits  that adults can subconsciously acquire languages and
they can consciously learn about language. But in this view learning cannot be
converted into acquisition; subconscious
acquisition dominates in L2 performance, and conscious learning is used only as a
Monitor,  i.e.  as an editor  to correct output after  it  has been initiated by the
acquired system. Thus in Krashen's Monitor theory implicit acquisition of L2 is the
essential aim of instructional programmes. Currently the pendulum is yet again in
swing: in the light of analyses of the disappointing abilities of graduates from
'grammar-free' foreign language (FL) programmes (Gomes da Torre, 1985) there
are new ca1ls for a return to explicit methods (Kingman + Cox Reports for English,
1988, 1989; James, 1986).
Such  swings  in  educational  practice  make  it  clear  that  there  is  no  simple
answer to  the question of whether  language acquisition reflects  conscious or
unconscious processes. There are two major causes of this continuing contention.
The first is the 'slipperiness' of the term 'consciousness' both in its constitutive
definitions  and  in  their  operationalisations  (McLaughlin,  1990;  Schmidt,  this
volume). The second is that 'language learning' is equally poorly defined, mainly
because of its numerous facets. Researchers really need to be clear in what they
are talking about with regard both consciousness and language, hence this sympo-
sium whose aim is a theoretical overhaul of our concepts in effort after clarity
and standardisation.
Our particular difficulties in these respects are far from unique. As Sigmund
Freud
(1915) wrote:
"The view is  often defended that sciences should be  built  up on clear and
sharply defined basal concepts. In actual fact no science, not even the most
exact,  begins with such definitions. The true beginning of scientific' activity
consists  rather  in  describing phenomena and then  in  proceeding to  group,
classify and correlate them…. It is only after more searching investigation of
the field in question that we are able to formulate with increased clarity the
scientific  concepts  underlying  it,  and  progressively  so  to  modify  these
concepts  so  that  they  become  widely  applicable  and  at  the  same  time
consistent  logically.  Then  indeed,  it  may  be  time  to  immure  them  in
definitions."
However,  perhaps  now,  after  several  decades  of  work  relating  to  these
matters, it is time to try to clean house, to clarify our definitions thus to begin
the resolution of the particular issue of the role of consciousness in language
acquisition.
In  his  useful  introductory  paper  Schmidt  provides  an  analysis  of  constitutive
definitions of 'consciousness'. He makes a number of recommendations towards
standardization of use of theoretical terms. While we an might quibble with the
minutiae of his analyses, his general argument is both sound and wide-ranging, and
we should consider his counsel if only because he has had the temerity to attempt
the task. His suggestions are as follows:
Incidental learning (Consciousness as intentionality) should be used to refer to
describe  situations  where  individuals  learn  without  intent  to  learn,  or  when
individuals learn one thing when their primary objective was to do something else.
In the past this has often been referred to as unconscious learning. Schmidt adds
the rider that it is important not to assume without independent evidence that
either the process or the product of such learning is unconscious in any other
sense.
Learning without attention (Consciousness as the product of attention) should
be reserved for learning that can be shown to have taken place without any
allocation of attention, voluntary or involuntary.
Explicit learning (Consciousness as awareness) is to be used when the learner
has online awareness, formulating and testing conscious hypotheses in the course
of learning. Implicit learning describes when learning takes place in the absence of
these processes; it  is an unconscious process of induction resulting in intuitive
knowledge that exceeds what can be expressed by learners.
Explicit instruction (instructed learning) should be reserved for situations
where subjects
are told about or taught rules in experimental studies or in the c1assroom.
Explicit  memory (Consciousness as control) refers to situations where recall
involves  a  conscious  process  of  remembering  a  prior  episodic  experience.  In
contrast,  implicit  memory is where there is  facilitation of the processing of a
stimulus as a function of a recent encounter
with the same stimulus but where the subject at no point has to consciously recall
the prior event.
I  will  therefore  adopt  these  terms  in  reviewing  research  concerning  the
involvement of conscious processes in one small area of language learning, that of
vocabulary acquisition. I have chosen this because its small size might make it a
more tractable problem. Even so, at first sight even this better definable area is
still far from resolved with respect the involvement of unconscious and conscious
processes. However, I will demonstrate that with precise notions of the different
aspects of vocabulary acquisition we can, to use Freud's terms, ‘group, classify and
correlate them', and that when we do a clear picture emerges. I will argue that
vocabulary  acquisition  as  a  whole  reflects  both  conscious  and  unconscious
processes,  but that  there  is  a sharp dissociation whereby the recognition and
production aspects of vocabulary learning rely on unconscious processes, whereas
meaning and
mediational  aspects  of  vocabulary  heavily  involve  explicit,  conscious  learning
processes.
Space restrictions limit the amount of supporting detail that I can present here, a
more complete  treatment is given in Ellis (in press b).
Current  applied  linguistic  theories  of  vocabulary  acquisition  range  from
'unconscious'  positions  to  those  which  hold  that  learners  should  be  explicitly
taught large amounts of vocabulary. Krashen (1989) exemplifies the unconscious
position. His Input Hypothesis assumes that we acquire language by understanding
messages  and  the  following  quotation  demonstrates  that  he  holds  it  to  be
unconscious in all of Schmidt's respects [added in' square brackets]: ''language is
subconsciously  acquired  -  while  you  are  acquiring,  you  don't  know  you  are
acquiring [implicit  learning]  your conscious focus is  on the  message,  not  form
[learning without attention]. Thus, the acquisition process is identical to what had
been termed 'incidental learning.' [incidental learning] Also acquired knowledge is
represented subconsciously in the brain - it is what Chomsky has termed 'tacit
knowledge'. [intuitive knowledge & implicit memory]" (Krashen, 1989, p. 440). At
the  other  extreme  there  is  a  history  of  attempts  to  collate  lists  of  a  core
vocabulary which teachers are recommended to  use to decide which words and
meanings should be taught first (e.g. West's 1953  General Service List of 2,000
words) [explicit instruction]. In parallel there have been developments of a wide
diversity  of  methods  for  explicit  [intentional,  attentive,  explicit]  vocabulary
learning instruction (see Carter, 1987; Nation, 1987 for reviews).
What is the language practitioner to make of all of this? How can both of these
positions be tenable? Does vocabulary come naturally and unconsciously or must it
be taught and learned? Or  else,  what are the aspects of vocabulary that are
amenable to instruction and study?
What is it to learn a word?
What is it to learn a new word? Minimally we must recognise it as a word and
enter it  into our mental  lexicon.  But there are several  lexicons specialised for
different channels of Input/Output (I/O). To understand speech the auditory input
lexicon  must  categorise  a  novel  sound  pattern  (which  will  be  variable  across
speakers, dialects, etc.) to read the word the visual input lexicon must learn to
recognise a  new orthographic  pattern  (or,  in  an  alphabetic  language,  learn to
exploit  grapheme-phoneme correspondences in  order  to access the phonology
and hence match the word in the auditory input lexicon) to say the word the
speech output lexicon must tune a motor programme for its pronunciation; to
write it the spel1ing output lexicon must have a specification for its orthographic
sequence. We must learn its syntactic properties. We must learn its place in lexical
structure: its relations with other words. We must learn its semantic properties,
its referential properties, and its roles in determining entailments. We must learn
the conceptual underpinnings that determine its place in our entire conceptual
system. Finally  we must  learn the mapping  of these I/O specifications to the
semantic and conceptual meanings.
The source of vocabulary
We have not been explicitly instructed in the vast majority of the vocabulary that
we  know,  nor  indeed  have  we  looked  up  these  words  in  dictionaries  -  most
vocabulary is learned from context (Sternberg, 1987).
Saragi, Nation & Meister (1978) asked adults to read Anthony Burgess' novel, "A
Clockwork Orange".  This contains a number of novel words from a Russian-based
slang  called  nadsat.  There  are  241  nadsat  words  in  the  novel  and  they  are
repeated on average 15 times. The subjects were simply asked to read the book
(which crucially did not contain a dictionary of these words). A few days after
finishing they were given a surprise test covering 90 nadsat words. Considerable
vocabulary acquisition had taken place -  subjects had picked up some 45 new
words simply by reading a novel.
People who read more know more vocabulary. This relationship between print
exposure  and  vocabulary  appears  to  be  causal  in  that  it  holds  even  when
intelligence is controlled (Stanovich & Cunningham, 1992).
There is thus no doubt that reading affords vocabulary acquisition. It is an ideal
medium for  it.  Moderate-to-low-frequency  words  -  precisely  those  words  that
differentiate between individuals of high and low vocabulary size - appear much
more often in  common reading matter  than they do in common speech.  And
there is opportunity for the reader to study the context, to form hypotheses at
leisure and cross validate  them,  to have time to infer meanings.  The word is
frozen in time on the page, whereas in speech it passes ephemerally.
However, without further experimentation it is impossible to resolve whether
this  vocabulary  acquisition  from  context  reflects  implicit  learning,  incidental
learning,  or  even  explicit  learning  without  explicit  instruction.  Contra  Krashen
(1989), it does not follow that vocabulary has been subconsciously acquired from
the fact that we have not been taught the vast majority of the words that we
know. That we have not been taught vocabulary does not entail that we have not
taught ourselves. It is quite possible, e.g., that there is some benefit to vocabulary
acquisition from the learner (i) noticing novel vocabulary, (ii) selectively attending
to it, and using a variety of strategies to try (iii) to infer its meaning from the
context and (iv) to consolidate the memory for that new word.
Studies  of  vocabulary  acquisition  from  reading  demonstrate  that  neither
dictionary look-up nor explicit instruction is  necessary for vocabulary acquisition,
The remainder of this  paper analyses the degree of involvement of conscious
learning processes in different aspects of vocabulary acquisition.
In brief, the evidence  that  will  be presented for unconscious processes in the
acquisition of I/O (receptive/productive) aspects of vocabulary includes:
• Child  first  language  vocabulary  development  is  essentially  ubiquitous
(following the frequency distribution of implicit learning systems).
• Child  first  language  vocabulary  development  is  relatively  insensitive  of
'academic intelligence' (it does not correlate with explicit learning abilities).
• Read vocabulary is so well preserved in dementia that it is taken as an index
of premorbid IQ (in loss it thus behaves like implicit memory abilities).
• Repetition  priming effects  in  lexical  decision and  word identification tasks
demonstrate implicit vocabulary I/O activation (implicit memory).
• Priming  studies  show that  I/O  lexical  modules  for  bilingual  individuals  are
independent (like modularised implicit memory systems).
• Amnesics who are deficient at explicit memory abilities show normal lexical
priming effects for both old and new lexical items (implicit memory).
• Effects  of  word  regularity  and  the  proportions  of  'friends  and  enemies'
demonstrate  implicit  acquisition  of  grapheme<->phoneme  correspondences
and spelling patterns for processing written vocabulary (implicit learning).
• Spoken word production is like other motor skins in that it is affected by
frequency  and  statistical  regularities  in  the  subcomponent  phonotactic
sequences (implicit learning). 
• Analyses  of  effects  of  exercise,  practice,  frequency  of  use,  and  life-span
practice  show  that  vocabulary  acquisition,  like  implicitly-acquired  skins,
conforms to the power law of learning (implicit learning and implicit memory).
• Connectionist  (Parallel  Distributed  Processing)  modelling  is  a  medium  for
investigating  implicit  learning  in  humans.  Such  models  of  conceptual,
vocabulary, morphology, and reading and spelling acquisition can an reproduce
to  a  remarkable  degree  the  characteristics  of  people  learning  language  -
behaviours previously assumed to be characteristic of rule-governed systems
even though the connectionist nets  do not  contain explicit  rules (imp1icit
learning).
The evidence  that will  be presented for conscious processes in the acquisition
of meaning aspects of vocabulary includes:
• When peop1e are assessed for their  understanding  of vocabulary there are
high correlations between academic IQ and, respectively, reading ability and
adult breadth of  vocabulary (correlations with explicit learning and memory
abilities)
• Free recall studies show that conceptual systems for vocabulary in bilinguals
are  interdependent  (like  explicit  memory  influenced  by  a  widfe  range  of
conscious, cognitive factors).
• The difficulty human amnesics (who demonstrate normal implicit memory in
the  absence  of  explicit,  episodic  memories)  have  in  acquiring  vocabulary-
concept pairings (explicit memory).
• Explicit  memory  for  words  is  affected  by  Depth  of  Processing  (explicit
memory).
• The  effectiveness  of  explicit,  deep  processing,  mediational  strategies
(semantic and imagery elaboration) in vocabulary learning  (explicit  learning
and memory).
• The effectiveness on vocabulary acquisition of training in such metacognitive
strategies word-analysis or inferring meanings from contexts (explicit learning
and memory).
Vocabulary and intelligence
We  can  assess  the  degree  of  involvement  of  conscious  learning  processes  in
vocabulary acquisition by considering between distribution of this variable in the
population and its correlation with ‘intelligence’ (since intelligence rests have been
developed  to  primarily  measure  explicit;  conscious  learning  abilities).  Because
implicit learning is a more basic form of learning it shows a different population
distribution:  evolutionarily  older  systems display  less  variation than  new ones.
Consider the innate skill of walking - just about everyone on the globe learns to do
it at roughly the same time and moves through the same motor milestones on
the way. Its ubiquity supportive evidence for it being an implicitly learned skill
which the brain is pre-programmed to acquire and refine. Chomsky used the same
argument to support the idea that language is an independent faculty separate
from non-linguistic cognitive abilities:  "As far as we know, the development of
human mental capacity is largely determined by our inner biological nature. Now
in the case of a natural capacity like language, it just happens, the way you learn
to walk. In other words language is not really something you learn. Acquisition of
language  is  something  that  happens  to  you;  it's  not  something  that  you do.
Language learning  is something like undergoing puberty. You don't learn to do it;
you don't do it because you see other people doing it; you are designed to do it at
a certain time." (Chomsky, 1988, pp. 173-174).
Notwithstanding wide variation in intelligence, just about everyone learns to
talk their L1. Lenneberg (1967, pp.156-157) suggests that children with non-verbal
IQs as low as 30 (i.e. more than 99.99% of people) can still complete the single
word stage of language.  If  we are  simply  interested in  vocabulary aspects  of
language acquisition, there is plenty of
evidence  that  the  input/output  of  vocabulary  is  relatively  independent  of
intelligence. Thus, for example, children severely mentally retarded as a result of
hydrocephalus,  may talk excessively with impressive vocabularies,  even though
their  speech lacks  content (Taylor,  1959;  Hadenius,  Hagberg,  Hyttnäs-Bensch &
Sjögren, 1962; Ingram & Naughton, 1962; Cromer, 1991 for review). Hadenius et al.
coined the term 'cocktail-party syndrome'  for the condition since there was a
"peculiar contrast between a good ability to learn words and to talk,  and not
knowing what they are talking about" (p. 118).
In  contrast  with  mere  I/O,  when  the  criterion  of  vocabulary  knowledge
additionally involves the understanding of words, i.e. the mapping between lexical,
semantic and conceptual domains, then there are, of course, strong correlations
between  academic  intelligence  and  vocabulary  size.  Learning  disabled  children
produce particularly low scores on the Vocabulary sub test of the WISC-R (The
Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children) where children have to demonstrate an
understanding of words by defining them (Kaufman, 1979). At ages between 6
and sixteen, WISC-R vocabulary scaled scores correlate an impressive 0.69 with full
scale  Stanford-Binet  IQ  (Wechsler,  1976).  Mill-Hill  Vocabulary  Test  scale  scores
correlate with Raven's Matrices ('non-verbal') IQ 0.60 in people under 30 years old
(Table SPM I, Raven, Court & Raven, 1983). W AIS-R vocabulary scaled scores reliably
correlate at greater than 0.80 levels with full scale W AIS-R IQ (Wechsler, 1981).
Taken together, these studies clearly reveal different, separable components
of vocabulary acquisition. I/O processing neither correlates highly with cognitive
mediational components nor with intelligence, yet these latter two abilities 'are
inextricably interrelated.
Priming studies of monolingual implicit and explicit memory systems
Word recognition and word naming are faster if you have recognised or named
that word within the last day. This occurs whether you explicitly remember having
read the word before or not,  and thus it  demonstrates implicit  memory -  the
tuning of the lexicon by experience. This is the basis of the main technique for
studying implicit memory, repetition priming, i.e. facilitation of the processing of a
stimulus as a function of a recent encounter with the same stimulus. Repetition
priming  has  been  observed  on  a  variety  of  tasks  that  do  not  make  explicit
reference to a prior study episode - the subject at no point has to consciously
recall  the prior event.  The tests most commonly used in priming research are
lexical  decision,  word identification,  and  word stem completion.  On the  lexical
decision task subjects have to rapidly decide whether a particular letter string is a
word (e.g. watch) or not (e.g. wetch) priming is reflected by a decreased latency in
the making of a lexical  decision on the second presentation of a letter string
relative to the first. The word identification test measures the minimum exposure
necessary for correct recognition of the word. Priming is indexed here by a lower
minimum exposure for repeated words. On  word completion tasks, subjects are
given a word stem (e.g. tab for table) and are instructed to complete it with the
first  appropriate  word  that  comes  to  mind.  Here,  priming  is  reflected  by  an
enhanced tendency to complete test' items with words exposed on a prior study
list.
Perhaps the clearest evidence for the separation of implicit I/O lexical systems
from semantic aspects of vocabulary comes from the interaction of depth of
processing and the types of operation that we ask subjects to do with words. I will
review later the many demonstrations that led Craik and Lockhart to propose a
Depth of Processing theory of learning and memory whereby the more subjects
analyse material semantically and the more they elaborate upon its meaning, the
better they will  recall  it in long-term tests of explicit memory (recognition and
recall tasks). Jacoby and Dallas (1981) showed subjects a list of familiar words and
had them perform either a study task that required elaborative processing (e.g.
answering questions about the meaning of the target word) or a shallow study
task that did not require elaborative processing (e.g. deciding whether or not the
target word contained a particular letter).  Explicit memory for the words was
subsequently tested by yes/no recognition and implicit memory was assessed by
savings in word identification tests. Recognition performance was higher
following elaborative study than non-elaborative study. However, implicit memory
was unaffected by the study manipulation: priming effects on word identification
performance were about the same following the elaborative and non-elaborative
tasks. Graf, Mandler and Haden (1982) report a similar pattern of results by using
free recall as an index of explicit memory and stem completion as a measure of
implicit memory. Taken together, experiments of this type (see Schacter, 1987 for
review)  clearly  demonstrate  that  word  identification  operates  according  to
implicit memory principles - it is affected by mere exposure and the frequency
thereof.  But  explicit  memory  for  words  is  clearly  affected  by  the  depth  of
processing and the degree to which subjects analyse their meaning.
Priming studies of bilingual implicit and explicit memory systems
The same dissociation can be found in the contrast between studies of implicit
and  explicit  memory  in  bilinguals  (Durgunoglu  and  Roediger,  1987;  Heredia  &
McLaughlin, 1992). Concern over the  organisation of the bilingual brain has a long
history: Is there a single memory store for both languages (the interdependence
or  compound model)  or  a  separate  store  for  each  (the  independence  or  co-
ordinate model)? The interdependence model assumes that items or concepts are
stored in the bilingual's  memory in the form of language-free concepts with a
single conceptual or semantic representation subserving the two lexical entries.
Evidence for the interdependence model typically comes from tests of explicit
memory tasks, e.g. free recall experiments where exposure to the same concept
in  different  languages  is  additive.  The  independence model  contends  that
bilinguals’  memory  is  organised  with  one  memory  for  each  language,  with
information in one language not readily available to the other system. Evidence
foe the independence view typically comes from implicit memory tasks such as
word identification or stem completion tasks (e.g. Kirsner, in press; Kirsner, Smith,
Lockhart, King & Jain, 1984). Kolers in 1966 suggested a resolution to this debate,
a  compromise  whereby bilinguals  have neither  separate  nor  shared  memories:
some  information  is  restricted  to  the  language  of  encoding  while  some  is
accessible to both linguistic systems. He has been proved correct in the light of
subsequent evidence.
Durgunoglu and Roediger (1987) investigated implicit and explicit memory in
bilingual subjects. Subjects saw words twice either in (a) English, (b) Spanish, or (c)
once in both languages. They saw other words in (d) English and Spanish and also
had to generate images of their referents, or (e) saw the same word twice in
Spanish  and  generated  the  English  equivalent  in  writing.  These  latter  two
conditions require more elaboration and a greater depth of processing. Explicit
memory for the words was tested with free recall, implicit memory with word-
fragment  completion  in  English.  In  free  recall  (i)  the  language  studied  was
unimportant, and (ii) elaborations such as generating a translation or forming an
image of the referent facilitated recall.  In word-fragment completion (i)  if  the
study  language  matched  the  test  language  fragment  completion  rates  were
significantly  higher  than  the  rate  for  non-studied  control  items;  if  the  study
language did not match the test language the fragment completion rates did not
differ  from  the  non-studied  items,  and  (ii)  elaboration  during  study  did  not
improve word-fragment completion rates.
These results again emphasise the distinctions between implicit,  data driven
I/O  modules  which  are  language  specific,  and  an  explicit,  conceptually  driven
cognitive  system  which  supports  the  semantics  and  concerts  which  both
languages describe. In bilinguals, implicit memory systems are independent, but
there is one compound explicit memory for the conceptual representations for
words in their two languages.
Evidence from global amnesia
Further  evidence  for  the  dissociations  between  explicit  and  implicit  learning
comes from studies of global amnesic patients (e.g. Korsakoff's syndrome) who, as
a result of hippocampal,  limbic system, or basal  forebrain lesions, show normal
implicit learning yet
total  anterograde  amnesia  for  explicit  and  episodic  memories  (Strauss,
Weingartner  &  Thompson,  1985  see Schacter,  1987  for  review)  The  perennial
anecdotal evidence for this comes from Claparede (1911) who reported that he
once shook hands with a female Korsakoff patient while concea1ing a pin in his
band. This caused the patient some pain, and when he returned a few minutes
later and offered his band again, she refused to shake it. Her avoidance continued,
even though she could give no explanation of why she was avoiding him. In this
case  implicit  learning  (behaviour  which  is  changed  as  a  result  of  a  previous
encounter) is preserved in the absence of any conscious, explicit recollection of
the event. Anterograde amnesia can inform us about the normal  processes of
vocabulary acquisition.
The  first  experimental  investigations  of  a  patient  (H.M.)  with  severe  and
selective anterograde amnesia were conducted by Milner (Scoville & Milner, 1957;
Milner, 1966). H.M. had intractable epileptic seizures which were finally treated by
surgery  which  involved  bilateral  resection  of  the  medial  temporal  lobes  and
ablation of the anterior two thirds of the hippocampal complex, the uncus, the
amyglada  and  the  hippocampal  gyrus.  Unfortunately  damage  to  these  limbic
structures (found naturally in Korsakoff'’s syndrome which can result from chronic
alcoholism) causes profound amnesia (Dudai 1989; Squire, 1992).
H.M. like other pure cases of anterograde amnesia had normal recall of events
that occurred before his brain damage and his short-term memory was normal. His
prior  semantic  knowledge,  inc1uding  that  of  vocabulary  and  concepts,  was
preserved as was evidenced by his continued high IQ and his lack of symptoms of
language disability. But he had no memory for episodes that occurred after the
operation.  Experimental  demonstrations  of  his  severe  learning  difficulties
inc1uded: (i)  his  failure when presented with twelve faces and asked to select
those that he bad seen from a larger array after a delay of only 90 seconds filled
with a distractor task, (ii) he was unab1e to learn a sequence of digits or light
flashes  that  was  longer  than  his  short-term  memory  span  despite  repeated
presentations, (iii) he failed on detailed recall of a complex drawing. Such findings
are now taken as diagnostic of cases of anterograde amnesia.
Memory  for  a  recent  event  can  be  expressed  explicitly,  as  conscious
recollection, or implicitly, as a facilitation of test performance without conscious
recollection.  Surprisingly,  while  amnesics  such  as  H.M.  show a  serve  deficit  in
explicit memory, they can learn implicitly, as evidenced by practice effects. They
show normal classical conditioning; they can acquire motor skills such as mirror
drawing as fast  and as well  as normal  individuals;  they show good perceptual
1earning (e.g.. reading text in a mirror) and they show normal performance on
tests  of  priming  which  are  taken  to  indicate  normal  implicit  memory abilities
(Kirsner, in press; Schacter, 1987; McCarthy & Warrington, 1990).
So what does study of amnesia tell us about vocabulary acquisition and use? If
amnesia  is  properly  characterised  as  a  deficiency  in  retrieval  dependent  on
conscious  voluntary  procedures  (explicit  memory)  while  automatic  procedures
(implicit memory) are preserved (Schacter, 1987), then their successes at using
and 1eaming vocabulary inform us about the degree to which vocabulary learning
is implicit. So what can they do in these respects?
Lexical access
1. Amnesics retain prior learned vocabulary and concepts and can access them
normally.
They have no difficulty on vocabulary or naming tests, and their reaction times
have been shown to be quite normal on word-retrieval tasks (Meudell, Mayes, &
Neary, 1981).
2. They show normal facilitation in repetition priming experiments involving pre-
existing memory representations such as common words or linguistic idioms
Warrington & Weiskrantz (1982) demonstrated that amnesics showed effects
of  repetition  in  naming,  category  identification  (e.g.,  object/animal),  and
generation of opposites (e.g. black/white). Subjects were presented with target
words and asked to respond as quickly as possible. On a second presentation of
the same stimuli in these tasks, the reaction times of both the amnesics and the
control subjects were. faster, therefore showing facilitation.
Thus the recognition of pre-existing vocabulary and the access of known spoken
or written word forms for expression relies upon automatic, implicit processes.
Learning new lexical units or word forms
3. Amnesics cannot explicitly recall new nonwords.
They cannot even explicitly recall words.
4. Amnesics sometimes show implicit memory for novel words.
The evidence on this is mixed. In the priming experiments described above,
amnesics  showed  normal  priming  for  items  with  pre-existing  unitary  memory
representations such as common words which they would have known before
trauma.  What  about  priming for  nonwords that  do not  have any  pre-existing
representations  as  units  in  memory?  If  they  show  priming  here  it  would
demonstrate that recognition units at least for the word forms (i.e. logogens) are
automatically set up for novel vocabulary as implicit memories which simply result
from experience.
Squire  (1992)  reviews  evidence  of  priming  in  amnesics  which  involves  the
acquisition of new information:
(i)  Speeded perception  of  a  novel  visual  shape  is  a  laboratory  analogue of
learning a  new script or a new ideogram (e.g. a new Kanji). Normal subjects and
amnesic  patients  improve  their  ability  to  reproduce  novel  line  patterns
independently  of  their  ability  to  recognise  these  patterns  as  having  been
presented previously (Musen & Squire, in press; Musen & Treisman, 1990). Gabrieli,
Milberg, Keane and Corkin (1990) also show that H.M. exhibits this effect. Normal
and  amnesic  subjects  exhibit  priming  of  unfamiliar  visual  objects,  again
independent of recognition memory performance (Schacter, Cooper, & Delaney,
1990).
(ii) One laboratory parallel of leaning the visual form of new word in a known
script is reading nonwords (of course, this task ignores any semantic aspects of
vocabulary). Amnesic patients show normal practice effects in the acquisition of
reading skill for regularly repeating nonwords (Musen & Squire, 1991).
It therefore appears that the implicit learning capabilities of amnesic patients are
sufficient to allow new pattern recognition networks to be established for the
visual forms of new language, whether this involves a new script or new words in
a known script. Both of these tasks also involve output modules - written copying
of new shapes, spoken production of new words. Given that amnesics show a wide
range of implicit learning of new motor routines, it seems likely that they show
similar  facilitation  in  their  language  output  modules.  However,  it  must  be
remembered that all of this implicit learning occurs in the absence of any explicit
recall of the words.
Accessing known conceptual associations
5. Amnesics show normal explicit learning of word pairs that are highly related.
Winocur and Weiskrantz (1976) showed that while amnesics' paired associate
learning of unrelated word pairs  was severely  deficient,  their  performance on
semantically  highly  related  word  pairs  (chair-bench,  wealth-fortune,  etc.)  was
normal. They can make use of prior semantic associations in explicit learning but,
as will be demonstrated below, they cannot explicitly learn new associations.
6.  Amnesics  show normal  repetition  priming  effects  of  already  known highly
related paired associates.
Gardner, Boller, Moreines, and Butters (1973) showed Korsakoff’s amnesics and
controls a categorised word list. When subjects were later given category cues
and asked to state the
first  category member that  came to  mind  in  a free association task,  both
amnesics  and  controls  showed  equivalent  amounts  of  priming.  Similar
confirmation of priming of prior relations comes can be found in Schacter (1985)
where amnesic patients showed normal levels of priming after studying a list of
common idioms (e.g. sour-grapes) and then writing down the first word that came
to mind on being given the stimulus word (sour- ?).
It seems therefore that implicit processes are sufficient to allow activation of pre-
existing  semantic  associations. Furthermore,  at  least  to  a  degree,  amnesics'
normal  implicit  input  module  activation,  their  normal  implicit  access  of  prior
semantic mediations, and their normal implicit output module activation can allow
near normal performance on explicit recall of highly related word pairs (though
their performance rapidly deteriorates as the semantic associations of the two
words becomes less strong - see Schacter, 1985).
Learning new conceptual associations
7.  Amnesics are severely deficient at explicit recall  of new pairs of associated
words.
HM scored zero on this when the test required him to explicitly generate the
second word of a previously studied pair when he was presented at test with the
first.  Generally,  verbal  paired  associate  learning  of  this  type  is  very  hard  for
amnesics even if they already know the words in question but are being asked to
form a new association between them.
To the extent to which vocabulary acquisition is learning of this type (e.g. that
aardvark - isan – armadil ....., 'what's an aardvark?'), then this deficit in amnesia
tells us that this type of vocabulary acquisition is explicit. Recognition or recall of
new semantic associations requires explicit memory.
8. Amnesics do not seem able to implicitly acquire novel semantic associations.
The  semantic  priming  experiments  discussed  in  6  above  involved  implicit
activation of pre-existing memory associations between highly related word pairs.
What  about  the priming of novel  word associations,  a  laboratory  analogue of
implicit  leaning of new meaning relations? Again, the evidence on this  issue is
mixed.
There  were  some  early  claims  for  normal  priming  of  novel  associations  in
amnesics.  Moscovitch,  Winocur and McLachlan (1986) assessed this  with  a task
involving reading degraded pairs of unrelated words and observed normal priming
of  novel  associations  in  amnesics.  Schacter  and  Graf  (1986)  found that  some
amnesic patients - those with relatively mild memory disorders - showed normal
implicit memory for a new association between unrelated words (e.g. study bell-
cradle,  test  bell-cra?),  whereas  severely  amnesic  patients  did  not  show  such
implicit memory for new associations. However, Squire's (1992) review concludes
that later studies (e.g. Cermak, Bleich, & Blackford, 1988; Mayes & Gooding, 1989;
Shinamara & Squire, 1989) demonstrate that amnesics do not exhibit this effect
reliably.
Moscovitch  et  al.  (1986)  suggested  that  memory  impaired  patients  could
establish novel associations in a single trial on the basis of results from procedures
where novel word pairs were presented one at a time, the subjects were asked to
read  as  quickly  as  possible  either  (i)  the  same  words  that  had  already  been
presented,  (ii)  a  new set  of words pairs,  or  (iii)  the  old  words presented in a
recombined fashion in new pairs. The evidence that an association had been made
between the word pairs was that  the recombined word pairs were read more
slowly than the repeated pairs. However, the effect was small  and has proved
difficult  to  replicate.  In  a  recent  improved  study  by  Musen  &  Squire  (1990)
recombined word pairs were read just as quickly as old word pairs suggesting that
the  priming  effects  were  at  an  input  lexical  level  rather  than  a  declarative
associative one.
The weight of the evidence is that amnesics' implicit learning is not sufficient to
allow new associations  between  two  semantically  unrelated  words  and  Squire
(1992) suggests that
subjects may need to access a link: between the two words that was formed
declaratively (explicitly) at the time of study in order to do this.
Combining an of these aspects: amnesics' learning of new L1 concepts and their
labels
Several  studies  have  addressed  amnesics'  learning  of  new  labelled  concepts.
Gabrieli, Cohen and Corkin (1983, 1988) have shown that H.M. and a small group of
other  amnesic patients  were unable to learn by means of rote repetition the
meaning of ten English words that they did not know before.
However,  amnesics  can  be  taught  new  vocabulary  by  means  of  a  clever
technique of vanishing cues which capitalises of their preserved implicit learning
abilities. Glisky, Schacter and Tulving (1986) taught amnesics a substantial amount
of  novel  computer  vocabulary  by  this  method  which  is  a  variant  of  priming
procedures. At the start the patient was presented with a definition (e.g. 'to store
a program') and the name of the command that enables that to happen ('SAVE').
On the next trial  the definition was repeated,  but only the first letter of the
command (as in stem-completion tasks) was presented. If the patient could not
answer,  a  second  letter  was  presented,  and  so  on  until  a  correct  response
occurred.  On  the  next  trial  the  definition  was  presented  again,  alongside  a
fragment  of  the  command  containing  one  less  letter  than  that  needed  for
successful recall on the previous trial; thus, if a subject had been successful with
sav-, he or she would see sa- on the next trial. Such learning was, of course, slow
compared to controls, and acquisitions were relatively inflexible. But nonetheless,
the  results  were  impressive  in  that  all  the  patients  were  able  to  learn  the
appropriate  commands  for  15  different  definitions  without  any  cues  being
available.  Similarly  Dopkins,  Kovner,  and  Goldmeyer  (1990)  have  shown  that
Korsakoff amnesics  could  acquire a conceptual  interpretation  of  a  new colour
name ('bice') but their conceptual information did not reach the same level of
abstraction as that of controls and moreover it was not integrated with the rest
of their colour knowledge.
Consider vocabulary learning, like paired-associate learning and other typical
associative learning tasks using explicit instructions to memorise. These results
suggest that amnesic patients with hippocampal damage may eventually be able
to  acquire  new  associations,  by  means  of  numerous  repetitions,  as  in  the
development of a habit. But this is far from normal learning. Their rate of learning
is grossly slow in comparison with normal subjects and the acquired knowledge is
abnormal  in  other  respects as well.  For example,  even after the knowledge is
acquired, it is still relatively inflexible, i.e., accessible only when exactly the same
cues are presented that were used during training. For amnesics -it really is akin to
parrot fashion learning - the patients have learned to produce a response, not to
retrieve items from memory. Typically they can speak new vocabulary in the same
way that a parrot can. By contrast, normal subjects learn quickly because they
can apply a totally different strategy to the learning of new conceptual links.
They can quickly memorise because they have an explicit,  cognitive system of
learning  new  associations  which  involves  hippocampal  and  other  limbic  brain
structures.
Conclusions
What can we conclude about vocabulary acquisition from studies of amnesics who
seem to retain implicit, automatic systems of learning in the absence of explicit,
declarative learning?
1. They show normal  implicit learning of the perceptual aspects of novel word
forms. Thus input modules for recognising novel word forms are tuned by
experience  and  therein  new  pattern  recognition  units  (input  logogens)
develop  simply,  implicitly,  and  automatically  as  a  result  of  frequency  of
exposure. (Of course, in all of these studies the learners have paid attention to
the stimuli, there is no evidence here for learning without awareness).
2. They  show  normal  implicit  learning  of  new  motor  habits  and  the  motor
aspects of  novel  word forms that  are necessary for  language production.
Thus output modules for producing
novel  word  forms  are  similarly  tuned  by  experience  and  new  pattern
recognition units therein (output logogens) also develop simply, implicitly, and
automatically as a result of practice.
3. They are  severely  deficient  at  developing  new conceptual  information,  at
making new semantic links. In-between the implicit modules for receiving and
producing language there is a conceptual system which operates according to
cognitive  principles,  not  those  of  habit.  Vocabulary  acquisition  is  as  much
concerned with meanings as it is word forms, and explicit learning is involved
in acquiring and processing meanings.
What has been preserved in amnesia are the various, special purpose, relatively
inflexible memory systems that permit one to behave differently as a result of
experience, although usually only gradually over many trials. These deal with the
abstraction of statistical regularities in the world (for perceiving new word forms)
and our  own behaviour  (for  producing new word  forms).  But  amnesics'  brain
lesions  do  not  produce  loss  of  awareness  without  impairing  some  domain  of
information  processing;  they  are  unable  to  learn  by  means  of  the  explicit
cognitive system which is concerned with word meanings and which links input
and output modules.
Neuroanatomical  aspects  of  explicit,  episodic,  cross-modal  memories  in
vocabulary representation
What  of  the  neuroanatomy  of  all  of  this?  Is  it  possible  to  bridge  linguistic,
cognitive and neuropsychological evidence and theory at an anatomical level of
analysis? The following tentative speculations are at least consistent with current
knowledge of brain function.
Mishkin & Appenzeller (1990) and Squire (1992 review research on the role of
circuits involving the limbic system and structures linked to it (the hippocampus,
amygdala, diencephalon [thalamus and mamillary bodies], prefrontal cortex. and
basal forebrain) in the formation of long term memories in monkeys. These are
the same structures which are damaged in cases of human amnesia. Animals with
normal  occipital  and  infero-temporal  lobes  but  damaged  hippocampus  and
amygdala  can  perceive  visual  patterns  normally,  but  had  impaired  long-term
episodic memories for visual stimuli.  Furthermore,  damage to these structures
resulted in a global anterograde amnesia - these animals were equally impaired on
touch recognition. Damage to the limbic system leaves old memories largely intact
but prevents the normal development of explicit memory for new information.
Thus it appears that while the occipital and inferotemporal lobes might subserve
perception and be the locus of pre-existing LT visual memories,  the subcortical
memory circuits must engage in a feedback whereby after a processed sensory
stimulus  activates  the  hippocampus (and possibly  the  amygdala),  the  memory
circuits play back on the sensory area, strengthening and so perhaps storing the
neural  representation  of  the  sensory  event  that  has  just  taken  place.  The
amygdala is a kind of crossroads in the brain with extensive connections with all
the  sensory  systems  in  the  cortex  and  also  deeper  into  the  brain  to  the
hypothalamus which is thought to be the source of emotional responses. Monkeys
with amygdala damage cannot form LT cross-modal memories - they cannot for
example learn to relate the touch of an object with its sight. Because they are
also slow in learning to relate an object to reward. Mishkin & Appenzeller suggest
that  the  amygdala  allows  association  between  stimuli  and  their  emotional
associations.
The  conceptual  meaning  of  a  word  is  a  conspiracy  of  perceptual  memory
traces.  Think  on  the  word  'Grandmother'.  In  so  doing  you  awaken  (whether
consciously or not) your memories of all of the times you saw her, you heard her
voice, you felt the touch of her hand and smelt her characteristic perfume. You
remember the happy times and the sad. Conceptual meanings draw on rich cross-
modal  associations.  Damage  to  the  limbic  structures  which  subserve  these
processes may thus deny the formation of these conceptual associations. This
damage  also  prevents  the  formation  of  explicit  LT  memories  between  the
perception of a word and the perceptual memories of its co-occurring referent.
The implicit language modules and their role in vocabulary acquisition
I/O modules are domain specific - e.g. visual word perception is not primed by prior
listening. When automatised they are 'informationally encapsulated' (Fodor, 1983)
- there are no top-down influences on the operation of input modules, and they
are cognitively impenetrable we have no conscious inklings into how they operate.
They work automatically - e.g., as evidenced by the Stroop effect it is hard not to
read  a  word  (Stroop,  1935).  Typically  they  are  acquired  by  means  of  implicit
learning: the underlying structure of a complex stimulus environment is acquired
by a process which takes place naturally, simply and without conscious operations.
Simple attention to the stimulus domain of words suffices for implicit learning
mechanisms  to  induce  statistical  or  systematic  regularities  in  this  input
environment.  And  so  our  lexical  systems  become  tuned  to  regularities  in
orthography  (letter  units  and  sequential  letter  probabilities),  to  regularities  in
phonology  (phonemes  and  phonotactic  sequences),  to  regular  patterns  of
grapheme-phoneme and phoneme-correspondences, to high frequency words over
low  frequency  ones,  etc.  And  input  modules  recognise,  and  output  modules
produce, high frequency patterns faster as a result. The "golden rule of sensori-
motor learning is much repetition" (Seibert, 1927, p. 309) - the more patterns are
repeated, the more frequent they are, the better they are acquired. This is the
sort of learning that connectionist models do very well, and frequency, recency,
and regularity  are  the  driving forces  which  tune  such systems (Gasser,  1990;
McLelland & Rumelhart, 1986; Broeder & Plunket, in press).
If we test vocabulary knowledge by tasks like lexical decision or word naming,
which fairly cleanly tap I/O modules, then words which have a high frequency in
the  language,  i.e.  words  which  have  had  considerable  life-span  practice,  are
processed concomitantly  faster.  Kirsner  &  Speelman (in  press)  and  Kirsner  (in
press)  propose  a  life-span  practice  model  to  explain  these  frequency  effects
whereby lexical  performance in  children and adults,  both in  LI  and L2,  can be
explained simply by reference to the power law of learning which Anderson (1982)
uses  to  explain  the  relationships  between  practice  and  performance  in  the
acquisition of cognitive skills generally, be they of sensory or motor nature. In so
doing Kirsner is proposing that these lexical effects can be adequately explained
in  terms of  general  principles of  implicit  learning and skill  acquisition without
recourse to specifically 'lexical models'.
So it is practice that makes perfect in the input and output modules and these
effects  are  clearly  seen  at  both word and  intra-word levels.  Ellis  (in  press,  b)
further considers these effects of practice on statistical regularities specific to
particular I/O modules.
The explicit conceptual system and its role in vocabulary acquisition
This  section  will  demonstrate  that,  in  contrast  to  the  I/Os  of  vocabulary
acquisition, explicit learning processes are essential for acquiring the semantic and
conceptual  aspects  of  vocabulary.  In  1932  Bartlett,  one  of  the  founders  of
modern psychology, stated that "memory is an effort after meaning". A more
recent statement of this theme is the  Levels of Processing framework of Craik
and Lockhart (1972). In this model information can be encoded in multiple forms:
e.g.  in  terms  of  semantic,  phonemic,  or  visual  features;  in  terms  of  verbal
associates, or as an image. Information processing moves from a sensory level of
analysis, through pattern recognition to semantic enrichment. Craik and Lockhart
suggest that "memory trace persistence is a function of depth of analysis, with
deeper  levels  of  analysis  associated  with  more  elaborate,  longer  lasting,  and
stronger traces" (Craik and Lockhart, 1972, p. 675). Levels of Processing holds that
shallow processing like oral rehearsal does not lead to long-term retention but
deep  processing,  whereby  semantic  associations  are  accessed  and  elaborated,
does.
Bower  and  Winzenz  (1970)  confirmed  the  usefulness  of  the  two  deep
strategies of semantic and imagery mediation. Subjects learned to associate 15
arbitrary  pairs  of  words  (e.g.  horse-cello)  under  one  of  four  conditions:  (i)
Repetition: they were asked to verbally rehearse each pair, (ii) Sentence Reading:
subjects saw each pair of words in a simple
sentence, and were told to read it and use it to associate the two critical words,
(iii) Sentence Generation: subjects were shown each pair of words and asked to
construct  and  say  aloud  a  meaningful  sentence  relating  the  two  words,  (iv)
Imagery: subjects were asked to visualise a mental picture or image in which the
two referents were in some kind of vivid interaction. The mean recall results in
each condition were as follows: Repetition 5.6, Sentence Reading 8.2,  Sentence
Generation 11.5, Imagery 13.1.
Deep processing mediational strategies are thus highly effective in long-term
L1 learning. They are equally useful in L2 vocabulary learning:
Imagery mediation using keyword methods
Atkinson  and  Raugh  (1975)  compared  learning  of  FL  vocabulary  by  means  of
keyword mnemonics with a control condition in which subjects used their own
strategies. Keyword condition subjects were presented with a Russian word and
its English translation together with a word or phrase in English that sounded like
the Russian word. For example, the Russian word for battleship is linkór. American
subjects were asked to use the word  Lincoln, called the keyword, to help them
remember this. Subjects who had used the keyword method learned substantially
more English translations of Russian words than the control group and that this
advantage was maintained up to six weeks later.
In this  method  the first  stage of  recalling the  meaning of  a foreign word
involves  the  subject  remembering  the  native  keyword  which  sounds  like  the
foreign word. The second stage involves accessing an interactive image containing
the referent of the keyword and 'seeing' the object with which it is associated
(this is the equivalent of the Imagery mediation condition of Bower & Winzenz,
1970). By naming this object the learner accesses the native translation.
Although  it  is  a  highly  effective  technique  (see  Levin  &  Presley,  1985  for
review), it does have some limitations: (i) it is of little use with abstract vocabulary
and  keywords  of  low  imageability,  (ii)  it  is  much  less  effective  in  productive
vocabulary learning than in learning to comprehend the L2 (Ellis & Beaton, 1993 a,
b) because imagery association in the keyword technique allows retrieval of the
keyword which is merely an approximation to the L2 form. The technique does
not  have  any  in-built  'mnemonic  tricks'  to  help  spelling  or  pronunciation.  For
effective  productive  vocabulary  learning  the  keyword  technique  must  be
complemented with repetitive practice at producing the L2 word forms. In sum,
imagery mediation does not contribute to the lexical productive aspects of L2, but
it does forge L1-L2 linkages.
Semantic mediation
(a) Using keywords
Sometimes FL words just remind us of the native word, a factor which usually
sterns from the languages' common origins or from language borrowing. Thus the
German Hund (dog) may be more easily retained than the French chien because of
its  etymological  and  sound similarity  with  the  English  hound.  Such  reminding,
whether based on orthography, phonology, etymology or 'borrowing' (e.g. 'le hot-
dog') typically facilitates the learning of that FL word.
If the reminding is not naturally there, one can create it using keywords and
semantic rather than imagery mediation. By simply remembering the keyword and
the native word in a mediating sentence it is possible to derive the translation
(the equivalent of the Sentence Generation condition of Bower & Winzenz, 1970).
(b) Deep Processing and Elaboration
Beck, McKeown, and Omanson (1987) advocate that learners focus on the meaning
of the new word and that they should act upon this meaning in a way that is
considered integrative in relation to already existing semantic systems. They are
thus urging students to be, in Craik and Lockhart's terms, deep processors. Crow
and Quigley (1985) evaluated the effectiveness for ESL students of several such
semantic processing strategies (such as the 'semantic field'
approach where subjects manipulated synonyms along with the target words in
meaningful sentences) and found them to be superior to 'traditional  methods'
over long time periods.
It can be advantageous to combine an of these aspects of (a) use of keyword
reminders  and  (b)  elaborative  processing.  Brown  and  Perry  (1991)  contrasted
three methods of instruction for Arabic students' learning of English vocabulary.
The keyword condition involved, presenting the new word, its definition, and a
keyword,  and  learners  were  given  practice  in  making  interactive  images;  the
semantic condition presented the new word, its definition, two examples of the
word's use in sentences, and a question which they were required to answer using
the new word; the keyword-semantic condition invo1ved an of these aspects. A
delayed  testing over  a  week later  demonstrated that  the combined keyword-
semantic strategy increased retention above the other conditions.
Metalinguistic strategies for inferencing
Sternberg (1987) presents  a  thorough analysis  of learning vocabulary from
context.  He identified three basic subprocesses:  selective encoding (separating
relevant from irrelevant information for the purposes of formulating a definition),
selective combination (combining relevant cues into a workable definition), and
selective comparison (relating new information to old information already stored
in  memory).  He  categorised  the  types  of  available  cue  and  the  following
moderating variables: (i) the number of occurrences of the unknown word, (ii) the
variability of contexts in which multiple occurrences of the unknown word appear,
(iii) the importance of the unknown word to understanding the context in which it
is embedded, (iv) the helpfulness of the surrounding context in understanding the
meaning of the unknown word (e.g. an equivalence cue such as 'an  ing is a low-
lying pasture' is most effective, a spatial cue such as 'the cows grazed the ing in
the shadows of the surrounding mountains' is more effective than a temporal cue
such as 'at dawn the cows grazed the  ing' for a spatial  concept,  etc.),  (v)  the
density of unknown words (too high a proportion of unknown words will thwart
attempts to infer meaning). Subjects trained in use of these moderating variables
or given practice in the processes of inferencing from context showed marked
gains  over  control  subjects  in  vocabulary  acquisition  from texts  in  a  pretest-
posttest design similar to the Clockwork Orange studies mentioned above.
Not only does such training promote inferencing from context, but also this
active  derivation  of  meaning  [explicit  learning]  makes  the  vocabulary  more
memorable. Thus Hulstijn (1992) provides experimental support for a  Levels of
Processing hypothesis of vocabulary acquisition whereby inferred word meanings
were retained better than those given to the reader through the use of marginal
glosses.
Interim summary
Taking these results together it is clear that it truly matters what learners do in
order to acquire the meaning of a new word. Successful learners use sophisticated
metacognitive knowledge to choose suitable cognitive explicit learning strategies
appropriate to the task of vocabulary acquisition. These include: inferring word
meanings from context, semantic or imagery mediation between the FL word (or
a  keyword  approximation)  and  the  L1  translation,  and  deep  processing  for
elaboration of the new word with existing knowledge.
Conclusions
Learners must acquire the I/O of new vocabulary: the pronunciation elements and
their compounds in the tongue as well as the graphemes and their patterns of
orthographic combination in the script. There are specialised modules, the input
and output lexicons, which acquire the word forms and regularities of the surface
form of language by implicit learning processes. Like other sensory or motor skin
systems, these modules do so automatically and
they are tuned by practice - by frequency, recency, and regularity. To the extent
that  vocabulary  acquisition  is  learning  these  surface  forms  of  language  then
vocabulary acquisition is an implicitly acquired skill. In saying this I am not denying
that the tunings of these systems cannot be guided by practice governed by
explicit knowledge. In the same way that verbal declarative knowledge can coach
the learner driver Cease off the accelerator, down with the clutch, etc.'), so it can
the learner speller (‘i before e except after c...'). In the early stages of any skill we
use conscious declarative knowledge on the way to automatization. But essentially
we learn to drive by driving itself, just as we learn to spell on the job of spelling or
speak by speaking. In the main, these aspects of vocabulary acquisition reflect
incidental learning.
However, the function of words is meaning and reference. And the mapping of
I/O  to  semantic  and  conceptual  representations  is  a  cognitive  mediation
dependent upon  explicit  learning  processes.  It  is  heavily  affected by depth of
processing and elaborative integration with semantic and conceptual knowledge.
Metacognitively  sophisticated  language  learners  excel  because  they  have
cognitive strategies for explicitly inferring the meanings of words, for enmeshing
them  in  the  meaning  networks  of  other  words  and  concepts  and  imagery
representations,  and  mapping  the  surface  forms  to  these  rich  meaning
representations. To the extent that vocabulary acquisition is about meaning, it is
an explicit learning process.
For any learning environment to be effective it must cater to an of these
aspects.  The  I/O  systems  are  tuned  by  practice,  so  the  programme  must
encourage this as much as possible. There is little doubt that naturalistic settings
provide maximum opportunity for exposure and motivation.. Reading provides an
ideal  environment  for  the  implicit  acquisition  of  orthography,  and  also,  in
individuals tutored in metacognitive and cognitive skills  for  inferring meanings
from contexts, explicit acquisition of meanings. But many are the times when we
have discovered a word's meaning, either from text or from a dictionary, only for
it  to  fade from our memory.  Explicit,  deep,  elaborative processing concerning
semantic  and  conceptual/imaginal  representations  prevents  this.  Learners  can
usefully be taught explicit skills in inferencing from context and in memorising the
meanings of vocabulary.
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